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 Summary 
With the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1992, the civil war raging in Mozambique since 
1977 was considered resolved. The agreement nurtured the hope for a transformation of 
the country into a pacified democracy and a slowly developing market economy. But in 
2012, the armed conflict between the former civil war parties FRELIMO (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front), the governing party since the 
country’s independence in 1975, and the opposition party and former rebel organisation 
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance) broke 
out again. Both conflict parties bear responsibility for this outbreak.  
Many explanations are primarily oriented towards (power-)political and economic 
factors within the two conflict parties involved as well as towards the unequal distribution 
of opportunities and of participation of the people in Mozambique in economic 
development. A closer look, however, reveals that the complexity of the violent conflict is 
not sufficiently captured by this explanation. For the fresh outbreak cannot be attributed 
solely to significant socio-economic disparities within the country and a political and 
(rentier) economic marginalisation of the opposition. Rather, the “proto-war” also points to 
more deep-seated conflicts over memory culture between the adherents of FRELIMO and 
RENAMO. Memory is contested in Mozambique, the national history is judged in widely 
different ways: Supporters of both movements cultivate their own respective memories and 
narratives and derive not only demands for the present from them, but also visions for the 
future. However, there has so far been hardly any reconciliation of the diverging memories. 
As an introduction, this report provides a short historical overview and background 
analysis of the armed conflicts in Mozambique since the late colonial period until the 
conclusion of peace in 1992. This is followed by a descriptive analysis of the historical 
factors and lines of development that led to the current conflict. In a further step, the 
report examines the root causes and explanatory approaches for this conflict. In doing so, 
it focuses on the memories rejected by the government and FRELIMO as an important 
reason for the fresh outbreak of the armed conflict. Against this background, the report 
examines how deficits in reconciliation and reckoning with the past from a memory 
culture perspective were able to negatively affect latent conflict constellations and 
contribute to the outbreak of open, also armed, confrontations. Concretely, this report 
appeals to German and international political decision makers and development 
organisations to implement a series of peacebuilding measures in Mozambique, namely in 
the areas of research, institution building and media work. 
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 1. Armed Conflict, Struggle over the Root Causes 
Since 2012, the southeast African country of Mozambique has been shaken by a partly 
violent conflict – largely without attracting wider international media attention. The 
Mozambican government tries to downplay the dimensions of this regionally limited 
“proto-war” (a militarily and geographically limited armed conflict) and avoids the label 
“war” (Morier-Genoud 2017a). The conflict parties are the governing party FRELIMO 
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or Mozambique Liberation Front), which has 
formed the government without interruption since 1975, and the opposition party 
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana or Mozambican National Resistance). The 
two parties already waged a civil war against one another from 1977 until 1992, which can 
be interpreted as a proxy war of the East-West conflict (Newitt 1995; 2017). With the 
conclusion of the peace treaty in 1992, the civil war was regarded as resolved and 
Mozambique’s transformation towards a pacified, partly free democracy (Abramowitz 
2018) as initiated. The fresh outbreak of conflict thus came as a surprise to many 
observers. Many arduous, also international rounds of negotiations have so far not been 
able to finally resolve the armed conflict. A ceasefire concluded in 2014 was already 
broken in early 2015. From August 2016 onwards, the failure of further peace talks 
resulted in intensified guerrilla attacks by RENAMO on government institutions and 
infrastructure. Among other things, RENAMO demanded the transfer of control over 
central and northern provinces of Mozambique, its strongholds. These confrontations led 
to refugee movements (Buchanan 2016). While a ceasefire has been in place between 
RENAMO and FRELIMO since December 2016, a resolution of the conflict is still 
pending. A resumption of fighting by one of the two conflict parties is possible at any 
given moment (Morier-Genoud 2017a).  
The conclusion of peace in the 1990s had raised great hopes at the time that the 
economically backwards former Portuguese colony governed by authoritarian politics 
would espouse the model of a liberal democracy and embark on the path of market-
oriented socio-economic progress (Francisco 2013; Manning 2008: 52). Indeed, the 
developments seemed to be positive at first. Soon, however, it became apparent that the 
economic upturn did not reach large parts of Mozambique’s population. Political 
opposition groups continued to have limited success. This has primarily affected 
RENAMO, which has remained caught in the role of the eternal opposition. So far, other 
political parties have not been able to challenge the governing party FRELIMO in national 
parliamentary or presidential elections at all, and in elections at the provincial level only 
to a very limited extent. Especially the socio-economically and infrastructurally margina-
lised north of the country has benefited from the positive overall economic development 
only to a limited extent.  
Politics and socio-economics alone fall short of explaining the ongoing armed conflict. 
It is undisputed that political, social and economic marginalisation are the mainsprings 
for the current conflict. The political and economic factors that have played an essential 
role for the conflict constellation both historically and presently include (1) the fight over 
revenue from the exploitation of recently discovered oil and gas resources in the north of 
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the country, (2) the high economic growth, from which the majority hardly benefits, 
especially in remote regions, (3) the exclusion of alternative political groupings by 
FRELIMO, which has also prevented a reckoning with the preceding civil war, (4) the 
losses of RENAMO and the gains of new parties in previous elections as well as (5) 
conflicts within the governing party (Morier-Genoud 2017a: 157–158).  
This enumeration of the most discussed root causes of the conflict makes it clear that 
issues of a lack of reconciliation of the population in the wake of the civil war between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO and associated antagonistic memory cultures are considered 
secondary and are often even overlooked. Frequently, the focus is on purely political-
institutional (such as constitutional provisions and alleged irregularities and discrimi-
nation in elections resulting in a marginalisation of the political opposition) or economic 
forms of explanation. A closer look reveals a much greater complexity, as other factors 
have also contributed to the fresh outbreak of an armed conflict. In the past decades, 
research and some media have early on examined the reasons for the civil war after 
independence quite comprehensively, and in doing so they have occasionally pointed to 
the different cultural and political positions of memory within society and the political 
sphere. With regard to the country’s memory culture, attentive observers are right in 
noting that there is a lack of institutions for reckoning with the past from a memory 
culture perspective: “Narratives across the political spectrum diverge radically, but there is 
no forum in which they can be hashed out and reconciled.” (Azevedo-Harman 2015: 147). 
For a long time, the political sphere and large parts of society in Mozambique have relied 
on avoidance and not on reckoning with the past and on reconciliation. Especially the 
government and FRELIMO “tried simply to look away from past misdeeds.” (Azevedo-
Harman 2015: 147). The disadvantages of such a strategy of avoidance and thus a weak 
social embedding of latent conflicts are obvious: “Wherever avoidance is dominant as a 
strategy for dealing with conflicts, it is likely that, when it fails, it will be replaced by 
destruction” [own translation] (Elwert 2004: 31).  
As other post-conflict states show, for instance the negative case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (e.g. Pingel 2008), processing conflicts over memory culture is a very 
essential dimension for overcoming the consequences of a civil war in a sustainable way. 
For achieving a permanent peace, this dimension must not be omitted, as it is central for a 
reconciliation reaching broad segments of the population. In general, (cultural) memory 
is understood here as an “interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts“ (Erll 
2008: 2) and, in contrast to related terms such as commemoration and recollection, it 
refers to dimensions (material, social and mental), levels (individual and collective), 
objects (what is remembered) and modes (how it is remembered, i.e. for instance 
religious, political, etc.) (Erll 2008: 3–7). 
Comprehensive research on Mozambique from a memory culture perspective does not 
exist so far. However, the evidence provided in this report1 indicates that factors related to 
1  I thank Sabine Mannitz and Bernhard Moltmann as well as Caroline Fehl, Nina Müller and Antonia Witt 
for valuable and constructive comments and suggestions. 
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the politics of memory might indeed have played an important role in the resurgence of 
the conflict. Reckoning with the past from a memory culture perspective should play a 
central role in the peace strategies that are required now.  
The report argues that this requires a number of efforts: (1) more research, as basic, 
systematic qualitative evaluations and analyses of the different historical narratives of 
memory culture in Mozambique are still lacking. How are they negotiated, challenged and 
sometimes negated in public, in the political sphere and in the media? What actors and 
groups invoke which respective narrative strands? How can the latter be used constructively 
as a basis for socio-political visions for the future? (2) It is necessary to build institutions 
that enable and structure a reckoning with the past from a memory culture perspective. For 
instance, this includes the option of establishing truth and reconciliation commissions, a 
transitional justice system or joint school book commissions of FRELIMO and RENAMO. 
Such measures could be promoted and accompanied by local and international organi-
sations or supranational institutions such as UNECSO. (3) At the media level, it is necessary 
to deal with the different, heterogeneous memory cultures relevant to the conflict within the 
Mozambican population.  
Against this background, the report (1) will first take a look at the more recent 
Mozambican history. Here, the focus will be on structural social and political 
circumstances and developments since the late colonial period. This section will also 
examine the causes of the country’s heterogeneous memory culture. In a second step, I 
will (2) then describe and analyse the course of the current conflict. Here, the focus will be 
on evidence and contents of diverging memory cultures – only fragmentarily investigated 
so far – as well as the question of how they have contributed to the outbreak of the 
ongoing conflict. Finally, I will (3) discuss in this report whether and how deficits in 
reconciliation and reckoning with the past from a memory culture perspective impact on 
latent conflict constellations at the micro and meso level in Mozambique. A “bottom-up” 
perspective could contribute to ensuring that in addition to politics and media, also and 
especially the memory culture perspectives of different segments of the Mozambican 
population are taken into account, in order to thus better understand the root causes of 
the conflict and to point out a path to a peaceful and permanent solution of the conflict. 
In a concluding chapter (4), the report will provide a summary and also sketch 
preliminary ideas on how the current conflict could be resolved sustainably, in a nation-
building process inclusive of memory cultures.  
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2. Traditions of Unresolved Conflicts and Violent Attempts at 
Resolution 
2.1 Anti-colonial Liberation Struggle 
Mozambique, located in the southeast of the African continent, with its approximately 
800,000 square kilometres and a population of currently around 28 million, hetero-
geneous with respect to religion and ethnicity – Makua, Tsonga, Yao, Makonde and 
Swahili form the largest ethnic groups; in addition to Christians of different churches, 
Muslims and followers of local religions live in the country – is one of the poorest states in 
the world (cf. UNCTADA 2016; UNDP 2016). Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania are immediate neighbours.  
The current conflict, which broke out unexpectedly, is part of a series of armed 
confrontations that have shaken the country since the 1960s. Just like other Portuguese 
colonies in Africa (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cap Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe), 
Mozambique is characterised by a repressive, authoritarian and centralist political, social 
and economic system – also compared to colonies of other colonial powers (cf. Newitt 
2002; 2017). One cause for this is the fact that the “mother country” Portugal itself, in 
contrast to the United Kingdom or France, for example, only became a democracy in 
1974. Like Angola, Mozambique, too, was a settler colony (until independence, Portugal 
promoted the settlement of several hundred thousands of Portuguese in the country), 
which went hand in hand with racism and discrimination targeting the African majority 
population in everyday life, in the education system and in professional life.  
Today’s Mozambique is of colonial origin, and since the late 19th century it unites 
areas that had never formed a political unit before (Newitt 2017: 1). The systematic 
colonial appropriation of the territory was carried out against native resistance. Already at 
that time, a course was set that shapes Mozambique until today and also affects the 
outbreak of the most recent conflict. This includes the location of the by far largest urban 
settlement, the capital Maputo, in the extreme south of the country. From there, the 
regions in the centre and the north of the country are still difficult to reach, sometimes 
even isolated. In addition, the colonial transport infrastructure planning, which aimed at 
transporting goods between the landlocked African colonies, linked the remote 
hinterland more closely to the neighbouring states of Zimbabwe and Malawi than to the 
capital. Accordingly, the capital and its surroundings and a few cities along the coast 
almost exclusively benefited from the economic upturn and modernisation. In view of the 
discrimination against the African population, Portuguese settlers and professionals 
became indispensable for the positive economic development of Mozambique (Newitt 
1995; 2002; 2017; Pélissier 1984). 
The leftist liberation movement FRELIMO, founded in 1962 under the leadership of 
Eduardo Mondlane, was originally characterised by in-fighting. Under the new president 
Samora Machel, it gained some inner unity from 1969 onwards. However, the leadership 
team was not representative of the country: Many hailed from the south of Mozambique; 
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in addition to intellectuals and poets, whites and mestizos, some Goans, whose ancestors 
hailed from Portuguese India, were represented in the party leadership. Despite this lack 
of representativity of its leadership team but thanks to its growing inner cohesion, 
FRELIMO, with the help of friendly governments, was able to take up the fight against the 
Portuguese colonial regime from 1964 onwards. This war focused on the north and the 
centre of the country.  
The struggle against the discriminatory colonial regime characterised by violence still 
constitutes a unifying element, both in the politically imposed memory and in the 
memory of large parts of the population. However, this does not apply to the 
developments since independence.  
2.2 Independence and Civil War 
After the end of the anti-colonial liberation war and in the wake of the Lusaka Treaty 
between FRELIMO and the second provisional government of Portugal from September 
1974, Mozambique gained its independence in June 1975. Like in other former 
Portuguese colonies (e.g. Angola and Guinea-Bissau), the new state emerged from the 
battle-hardened liberation movement transformed into a political party. FRELIMO 
became a unity party with a communist programme. At that time, more than ever, 
educated Mozambicans from the capital region as well as non-Africans dominated the 
FRELIMO leadership under the charismatic first state president Samora Machel. After the 
withdrawal of the Portuguese, FRELIMO had to rely on the local middle class from the 
previous colonial administration that often had an ambivalent relationship to the new 
government. FRELIMO acted under the banner of anti-colonialism and the elimination of 
exclusion and injustice. It demanded the country’s own national Mozambican path 
beyond colonial exploitation. It collectivised and nationalised the economy, relied on 
reeducation and politicisation in order to make the vehemently proclaimed utopia of a 
better world a reality. Reality, however, soon exposed the downsides: Economic decline, 
autocratic tendencies, top-down nation-building, forced labour and dependence on 
foreign countries including apartheid South Africa counteracted Samora Machel’s 
vociferous rhetoric of progress and self-determination. In addition, there were a tiring 
and ultimately counterproductive permanent mass mobilisation for a new society and 
against “enemies” suspected in many places (traditional authorities, the religious commu-
nities, former members of the Portuguese colonial army, etc.), an ineffective centrally 
planned economy, severe economic difficulties and shortages, a radical modernisation 
policy targeting structures and institutions discredited as “traditional” and backwards, as 
well as policies neglecting rural socio-economic interests. As a result, large parts of the 
population were alienated from the government and FRELIMO and turned away. It 
proved to be fatal that the foundation of collectivised villages, which drew on the 
Tanzanian concept of Ujamaa, (unintentionally) resembled the Portuguese forced settling 
of rural residents in so-called aldeamentos (village settlements) during the war of 
independence. Like the Portuguese colonial regime, FRELIMO as party and state in one 
also relied on repression and coercion. Political pluralism or regional autonomy were not 
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envisioned – no more than free elections or the guarantee of civil liberties. Parts of the 
population were deliberately excluded from political participation (Cahen in Guilengue 
2016; Newitt 1995; 2002; 2017; Orre 2010: 216–340; Rupiya 1998; Sengulane/Gonçalves 
1998: 28; Sumich 2012: 137). 
There was a lack of legal channels for voicing criticism of the policies in a peaceful 
way, for correcting political mistakes made by the state and party and for opposition work 
against the government’s measures (Cahen in Guilengue 2016). Growing dissatisfaction 
in parts of the population as well as the (Southern) Rhodesian2 and South African 
geopolitical interest in curbing communist tendencies led to the founding of RENAMO in 
1975. First, it was led by the FRELIMO dissident André Matsangaissa. In view of the 
widespread dissatisfaction, rural Mozambique in particular provided fertile ground for 
the founding of RENAMO, driven by the white minority regime in (Southern) Rhodesia. 
At first, the resistance against autocratically decreed innovations therefore had a regional 
and ethnic character. In the beginning, RENAMO only attacked from Rhodesia and later 
South Africa. The conflict starting now between the FRELIMO government and 
RENAMO also acquired the character of a proxy war in the context of the East-West 
conflict. While states of the Eastern bloc and many African states such as Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania supported FRELIMO, (Southern) Rhodesia, South Africa, the United States and 
other Western countries backed RENAMO. The result was a civil war waged by 
RENAMO in a bloody and brutal manner, which mainly affected the centre and the north 
of the country, caused migration and suffering, led to the destruction of infrastructure 
and accelerated the economic decline. RENAMO was infamous for its human rights 
violations against civilians. Forced recruitments were part of its strategy. However, 
RENAMO’s internal organisation was (and is) even more undemocratic than that of 
FRELIMO, as its long-term leader Afonso Dhlakama has been making all decisions since 
1980. While it was reviled by FRELIMO as a foreign terror group maintained by the white 
minority regimes and lacking any backing within Mozambique, RENAMO was actually 
initially welcomed as a liberator by many rural residents. The bulk of the RENAMO 
members hailed from the rural centre of the country, where large parts of the population 
were dissatisfied with the preceding resettlements, the neglect of small-scale agriculture as 
well as the persecution and oppression of traditional authorities, religions, practices etc. 
In fact, local rivalries and feuds were superimposed on the conflict between FRELIMO 
and RENAMO, which the latter deliberately exploited for its goals. In the eyes of 
FRELIMO, RENAMO pursued an anti-modernist agenda; the governing party’s own 
mistakes were consciously ignored.  
With FRELIMO growing closer to South Africa from the mid-eighties onwards (e.g. 
through the Nkomati Accord of 1984, which was largely ineffective but formed a 
2  In 1965, the white minority regime unilaterally declared the British colony of Southern Rhodesia 
independent. The British government adhered to the name Southern Rhodesia, whereas the separatists 
called the state Rhodesia. In 1980, after free and universal elections, the country gained internationally 
recognised independence as Zimbabwe.  
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milestone), RENAMO increasingly had to stand on its own feet and act from bases within 
Mozambique. Instead of relying on the destruction of infrastructure, RENAMO shifted to 
permanently occupying territory and was thus able to conquer significant areas in the 
centre of Mozambique and put pressure on the government. As a consequence, many 
government institutions outside the capital were often hardly functioning or present 
anymore. Only in 1987 did RENAMO outline a party programme, which demanded inter 
alia the restoration of religious freedom and the rehabilitation of traditional authorities. 
Only since then has RENAMO entered strategic alliances with traditional authorities and 
rural religious groupings in order to establish a sustainable stable support base and to 
sharpen its profile as an advocate of the oppressed and marginalised (Andersson 1992; 
Bertelsen 2003; Cahen in Guilengue 2016; Cabrita 2000; Emerson 2014; Gonçalves 1998; 
Newitt 1995; 2002; Orre 2010: 216–340; Rupiya 1998; Sumich 2012: 138; Vines 2013). 
2.3 Rapprochement and Conclusion of Peace 
The policies of the governing FRELIMO as well as RENAMO’s resistance, viewed as 
legitimate by parts of the population, laid the foundation for a strongly heterogeneous, 
even antagonistic memory culture that characterises Mozambique until today. Yet, the 
political rapprochement of the two conflict parties from the late eighties onwards could 
certainly have entailed a rapprochement in terms of memory culture. All parties involved, 
but not least FRELIMO with its orientation towards a long-term consolidation of power, 
are to blame for the fact that this opportunity was wasted.  
Opportunities for a lasting pacification were created by a series of factors: The end of 
the Cold War and apartheid, the dissociation of the US from RENAMO and the political 
and economic convergence of Mozambique with Western states and international 
organisations (accession to the World Bank, to the International Monetary Fund and the 
Lomé Convention in 1984), as well as the fact that the conflict between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO had led to a dead end, induced a fundamental change. Since the late 1980s, 
Mozambique underwent a neoliberal structural adjustment. In 1990, the FRELIMO 
government introduced reforms for opening not only the economy, but also the political 
system. In 1992, a General Peace Agreement, which also provided for demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes for former combatants under the supervision of a UN mission, 
was concluded in Rome due to Western pressure (Acordo Gera de Paz, AGB) (The Rome 
Process: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique 1998). However, a real reconciliation 
between the previous conflict parties did not take place. The agreement also did not 
provide for a mechanism for creating institutions for a sustainable reckoning with the war 
and the rights violations committed in its course. Although the agreement remained 
imprecise in many ways, it led to the cessation of hostilities, to demobilisation and to the 
holding of the first free elections under international (UN) supervision in 1994 (Emerson 
2014; Gonçalves 1998; Newitt 2002; Rupiya 1998; Vines 2013). With the introduction of 
multiparty democracy, the conclusion of peace with RENAMO guaranteed a long-term 
consolidation of the political hegemony of FRELIMO: The 1994 parliamentary and 
presidential elections brought a victory for FRELIMO and a confirmation of the state 
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president from its ranks, Joaquim Chissano (term of office: 1986–2005). However, 
RENAMO, transformed into a party, was able to triumph in five of the eleven provinces 
in the centre and north of the country – to the surprise of many, in view of the atrocities 
committed in the past. Compared to FRELIMO, the RENAMO members of parliament 
were characterised by a lower level of education. However, RENAMO had succeeded in 
attracting new supporters who were not involved in the war. The following years brought 
further economic reforms such as privatisations, which resulted in a huge economic 
upturn. However, this was and is only to the benefit of a minority, whereas the health and 
education system – formerly priority issues of FRELIMO – were neglected. A 
constitutional change in 1997 granted the municipalities a certain degree of autonomy. 
However, FRELIMO shied away from a full decentralisation since it feared electoral 
victories of RENAMO; the Mozambican administrative system thus remained strongly 
centralised. The 1999 elections consolidated the results from 1994, with gains for 
RENAMO. After independence, FRELIMO had been hostile towards and dismissive of 
traditional authorities, cultural traditions and local worldviews. Now, it copied 
RENAMO’s strategy and tried to build alliances with traditional authorities and present 
itself as the protector of their traditions (Bertelsen 2003; Emerson 2014; Francisco 2013; 
Newitt 2002; 2017; Orre 2010: 216–340; Vines 2013; Weimer/Carillho 2017).  
In contrast to Rwanda, South Africa or Sierra Leone, for example, which also had to 
overcome long-standing, deep-seated conflicts, the peaceful transformation resulted 
neither in the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and/or another 
institutionalised form of processing memories and historical narratives, nor in the 
creation of a transitional justice system and/or a community-based jurisdiction at the 
local level. Although these institutions were criticised and numerous flaws in carrying out 
justice and reconciliation work were pointed out (Barria/Roper 2005; Sesay 2007; Clark 
2012; Donlon 2013; Brehm et al. 2014), they still opened up channels for achieving at least 
some degree of reconciliation. Mozambique, however, embarked on a different path, 
similar to Angola’s. There, opposing narratives of memory stand irreconcilable and 
unreconciled, after the government achieved peace through victory over the rebel 
movement in 2002 and consequently explicitly rejected a truth and reconciliation 
commission (Pedro 2007: 123).  
3. After the War is before the War?  
Lost Opportunities in the new Millennium 
At the turn of the millennium, peace in Mozambique seemed permanently secured. 
Formal democratic rules of the game were largely being adhered to. And all this without 
the former conflict parties having involved their supporters and the overall population in 
an open conversation about past injustice, having reckoned with the civil war or having 
apologised – and also without having critically examined their own respective essential 
historical narratives – unless one counts exceptions such as FRELIMO’s rethinking of its 
attitude towards traditional authorities, religion etc. From a historical viewpoint, this 
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arrangement of dealing with the past, which reminds of the problematic case of Rwanda 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006) – and that is endorsed by a minority of publicists (Rieff 2016) – may 
be understandable:  
“I suspect that Mozambique’s way of adjusting to the violence of the civil war – just 
mention it as little as possible – emerged as the simplest way of moving ahead at a vital stage 
of the peace negotiations. It was not theorised but was an ad hoc arrangement. […] 
However, the danger of this Mozambican policy of ‘forgetting’ is clear. It removes the threat 
of establishing any accountability for criminal acts in the political arena.” (Newitt in 
Guilengue 2017) 
Moreover, this avoidance of a reconciliation process and thus potentially of a convergence 
of not only diverging but in essential aspects even fundamentally opposing memory 
cultures contributed little to closing the remaining societal rifts and to sustainably steering 
the previously armed conflict towards a peaceful course. Thus, contrary versions of history 
and memory narratives used as “weapons” continued to coexist without being negotiated. 
Until today, “silence is regarded as instrumental to achieving peace“ (Igreja 2008: 539). 
There has been hardly any negotiating of an integrative memory culture that could have 
contributed to a sustainable, peaceful way of dealing with the conflict and thus to 
integrative, bottom-up nation-building. Only to a very insufficient extent has the preceding 
political conflict been translated into conflicts of memory and rendered fruitful for future 
national compromise and reconciliation. Thus, opportunities were lost for drawing on 
conflicts of memory for shaping a nuanced and thus integrative memory culture.  
In the first century of the new millennium it became clear that FRELIMO used state 
institutions and media for its purposes in order to win elections. The tendency to 
marginalise other parties even increased under the new state president from the ranks of 
FRELIMO, Armando Guebuza (term of office: 2005–2015). For “there has been little 
attempt by Frelimo to co-opt and incorporate individual Renamo figures into the ruling 
elite“ (Newitt in Guilengue 2017). In addition, there were electoral irregularities and 
unequal provision of resources, which gave a clear advantage to FRELIMO. For good 
reason, many citizens continue to equate state and FRELIMO party even after the multi-
party system was introduced. RENAMO did not display an increased tendency towards 
democratic practices, either. They and their leader responded to diminishing electoral 
successes with guerrilla rhetoric. Their leader Dhlakama repeatedly voiced threats of 
separatism and boycotts. At the same time, he and RENAMO stuck to a rhetoric dis-
playing a lack of willingness to reconcile and an insistence on obsolete positions from the 
founding period of the movement – for instance, Dhlakama calling FRELIMO 
“communists” and “Marxists” and, in the same breath, portraying RENAMO as “father” 
and “guardian” of democracy (cited in Vines 2013: 386). At the same time, RENAMO 
paints a one-sided picture and tries to cast itself as a victim of FRELIMO and its (alleged) 
electoral fraud. Regular changes in the electoral system as well as political blockades in the 
wake of elections bear witness that, while Mozambique is structurally democratised, the 
political culture still has autocratic and paternalistic traits. For twenty years already, 
RENAMO has unsuccessfully been demanding an effective decentralisation of the country 
and a revision of the constitution with its “winner takes all” principle. RENAMO did 
repeatedly gain majorities in the parliaments of several provinces. However, the 
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constitution stipulates that the provincial governors, who in reality wield more power 
than the representatives of the people, are appointed by the government. Therefore, the 
provinces in which RENAMO holds the majority of the parliamentary seats are never-
theless ruled by governors with FRELIMO party membership. FRELIMO did not react to 
RENAMO’s demands to change this, any more than to RENAMO’s offers of talks for 
cooperation. Corresponding bills by the opposition were quashed by FRELIMO with its 
majority in the national parliament. In order to differentiate itself from RENAMO, 
FRELIMO still portrays itself as the party of national unity. In fact, FRELIMO does have 
members from all ethnic groups and religions. Everyday life is shared in a largely peaceful 
way by the different ethnic groups and religions in the country despite differences in 
culture and identity. Besides RENAMO, a further party is affected by the structural 
discrimination: the MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique or Democratic 
Movement of Mozambique), whose founders in 2009 included RENAMO renegades 
(Azevedo-Harman 2015: 140–46, 148; Bertelsen 2003: 268, Cahen in Guilengue 2016; 
Cortês 2016: 2–3, 5; Guilengue 2017; Manning 2008: 43–71; Vines 2013). 
3.1 Old Opponents, New Conflict 
In early 2012, the political situation in Mozambique escalated and caused a deep break in 
the usually mostly nonviolent way the conflict between the FRELIMO government and 
RENAMO had been dealt with. The reasons included the long-standing demands of the 
internally divided RENAMO for (personal and financial) participation in the recently 
discovered natural gas resources, the acceptance of more RENAMO veterans into the 
army and a reform of the electoral system. However, FRELIMO’s government majority 
did not react to the demand. In early March 2012, armed confrontations broke out in 
front of a provincial party headquarters between the riot police on one side and around 
300 former RENAMO fighters as well as Dhlakama’s “presidential guard”, which remains 
under arms, on the other. Despite subsequent negotiations, the RENAMO leader 
threatened to prepare for a new war (Azevedo-Harman 2015; Cortês 2016; Vines 2013). 
A further aggravation of the conflict occurred about one year later, in April 2013, 
when the Rapid Reaction Force attacked a RENAMO office in the centre of the country 
with weapons of war and gas grenades. Subsequently, RENAMO fighters attacked a police 
station and the most important road linking the north to the south of the country. 
RENAMO stuck to the practice of concentrating attacks on this main road until October 
2013, when the government started an offensive with the goal of arresting Dhlakama. 
However, he was able to escape in time, whereupon the government had party offices in 
other cities and the homes of Dhlakama and his family searched. In response, RENAMO 
extended its attacks on means of transport, barracks and international companies in the 
north of the country to a larger area. These attacks, however, veil the fact that RENAMO 
– in contrast to the well-equipped government units – can only draw on relatively few, 
elderly fighters and does not have sufficient equipment at its disposal. As a result of the 
incidents of October 2013, RENAMO expanded its list of demands: reform of the 
electoral system, the electoral commission and the electoral secretariat; municipal 
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elections, reform of the armed forces, a “de-partyfication” of the state directed at 
FRELIMO as well as an administration of the natural resources (Azevedo-Harman 2015; 
Cortês 2016; Morier-Genoud 2017a).  
In January 2014, RENAMO started attacks again, now also including the provinces in 
the South that had so far been spared. With the help of national, independent civil society 
actors and through numerous negotiation rounds, an agreement on the cessation of 
hostilities was reached in August 2014. The outgoing President Guebuza was able to 
portray himself as a peace broker, while the agreement enabled his opponent Dhlakama 
to start his campaign for the impending elections. The latter were characterised by fraud 
and the use of violence on both sides. While RENAMO had been losing votes 
continuously since the 2004 elections, it was able to return to its 1999 level in 2014. By 
contrast, the MDM succeeded especially in the capital as well as in the central and 
northern provinces. The former FRELIMO minister Filipe Nyusi, who was seen as a 
compromise candidate by Guezeba’s grace, was elected successor of state president 
Guebuza. Since entering office, however, Nyusi has gained some profile of his own. Nyusi 
is the first president who did not take part in the war of independence; he thus belongs to 
a new generation of FRELIMO politicians. Both opposition parties refused to recognise 
the election result; Nyusi was nevertheless sworn into office in January 2015. In February 
2015, he succeeded in reaching an agreement in negotiations with Dhlakama that 
provided for a decentralisation of Mozambique and a transfer of power to RENAMO in 
the provinces in which they had been victorious. A split in FRELIMO – also along 
generational lines – became apparent when its leadership board and parliamentary group 
surprisingly rejected the agreement in April. It remained controversial whether Nyusi had 
been playing a double game or had been betrayed by his own people. In September, 
RENAMO escalated the armed conflict especially in the north and centre, after 
Dhlakama’s home in the second largest city Beira had been surrounded by police. 
Rumours were flaring up of an attempted murder. After targeted killings of RENAMO 
members, RENAMO and others also alleged the existence of death squads associated with 
FRELIMO. This in turn led to the assassination of FRELIMO party members by 
RENAMO fighters. Despite new negotiations, by the end of 2016 RENAMO extended its 
attacks to all provinces of the country except for those in the extreme north and south, 
including the capital Maputo. Subsequently, the government sent police and military 
units, allegedly receiving help (army troops and military equipment) from Zimbabwe and 
China (Azevedo-Harman 2015; Cortês 2016; Morier-Genoud 2017a; Pereira 2016). 
3.2 Reshuffling the Deck 
In early 2016, the constellation in Mozambique changed fundamentally when it became 
known that the former state president Guebuza and his finance minister had left hitherto 
unknown public debts of more than 2 billion US dollars (dos Santos 2016; Morier-Genoud 
2017a). The International Monetary Fund and the most important donors subsequently 
withdrew, which put the government in Maputo under pressure. The national mediators 
(four members of the clergy and a university rector) in the conflict negotiations were 
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replaced by international ones (sent by the European Union, the Vatican and the Global 
Leadership Foundation). The topics were also adjusted: cessation of hostilities; 
governmental power for RENAMO in the six provinces in which it had reached a majority 
in the 2014 elections; establishment of nonpartisan security organs and disarming and 
reintegration of the RENAMO fighters. Yet again, FRELIMO prevented an agreement that 
it had first supported. Not least, the government feared that, in taking over the government 
in the central provinces, RENAMO would gain access to natural gas that would be 
conducted from the north to the south in the future. In December 2016, Dhlakama 
proclaimed a truce for the Christmas period, which he extended until February in early 
January 2017. After another widely expected unilateral extension by sixty days in early 
March 2017, Dhlakama proclaimed an indefinite unilateral ceasefire on May 4, 2017, which 
has remained in place since. Already in late April, president Nyusi had announced a 
withdrawal of the army from positions near Dhlakama’s headquarters in the mountains of 
Gorongosa. Rounds of negotiations mediated by national actors as well as direct talks 
between Nyusi and Dhlakama have set the tone since then. Evidently, the ongoing financial 
scandal, which is affecting ever broader circles and apparently also included secret weapon 
purchases, and the resulting empty coffers are increasingly putting the government under 
pressure to negotiate and are making concessions necessary. The scandal prompted the 
group of the fourteen budget supporters (World Bank, African Development Bank, EU, 
United Kingdom, Austria, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Ireland and Finland) as well as Japan and the United States to end their direct budgetary aid 
(Agência de Informação de Moçambique 2016; dos Santos 2016; Morier-Genoud 2017a; 
Africa Research Bulletin 2017a; Africa Research Bulletin 2017b; Pereira 2016; Africa 
Confidential 2017a; Africa Confidential 2017b). 
A new “front line” that opened up in October 2017 shows how fragile the political 
situation is in Mozambique: On October 5, about thirty armed suspected Islamists 
attacked a police station in a town in the Muslim, poverty-stricken extreme north of the 
country. They killed police officers and occupied the town until the government security 
forces were able to bring the situation back under control. On October 4, the mayor of the 
country’s third biggest city, Nampula, who belonged to the opposition party MDM but 
was alienated from his party, had been shot dead during a public ceremony commemo-
rating the signing of the 1992 peace agreement (Morier-Genoud 2017b; Vines 2017).  
4. The Current Conflict Viewed from Bottom-up Perspectives of 
Memory Culture 
4.1 Mozambique’s Non-Negotiated Conflicts of Memory 
As this outline of the events of the last years makes clear, the root causes of the latent but 
ongoing conflict can be traced back to political and economic imbalances. A closer look, 
however, reveals that the root causes are far more complex. Rather, the rifts in Mozam-
bique are considerably deeper than what preceding explanations might have given reason 
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to assume, for the conflict includes the entire population also beyond the political elite. 
This fact implies the necessity of opening the bottom-up view for the diversity of 
memories within the population, which could be drawn upon for an accommodation 
between different memory cultures. 
The perception of the preceding descriptions very much concentrated on a macro 
perspective from the view of the national political arena, especially from the capital. In 
addition to the country’s politicians, the central players in this arena include diplomats 
and staff from international institutions of development cooperation. It can be critically 
questioned whether the following assessment is correct: “The conflict in Mozambique was 
instigated and led from the top, not the grassroots. In other words, it was a quarrel of 
elites rather than a matter of ordinary people laying waste to neighbouring villages” 
(Azevedo-Harman 2015: 147). For RENAMO gained additional votes in the recent 
elections, which can definitely be interpreted as support for RENAMO’s approach by 
parts of the population. Nevertheless, it is important to contrast “top-down” perspectives 
of elites with “bottom-up” perspectives of the Mozambican majority population (e.g. 
Maschietto 2016: 121–127; Schafer 2007: 139–165) in order to document and analyse 
historical narratives in all their diversity and to apply them for reconciliation work and 
peacebuilding. The research on memory in Mozambique has so far rather looked at elite 
discourses, frequently omitting narratives and viewpoints of the majority of the 
population (e.g. Igreja 2008; 2013; Sumich 2012). Nevertheless, biographical-qualitative 
studies on the memories of those affected by experiences of violence from the civil war, 
for instance, are indeed available (e.g. Igreja 2010).  
With a focus on a “top-down” perspective, the fact disappears from view that the 
current conflict is also based on contested memories within the population. For the fresh 
outbreak of the conflict also points to non-negotiated conflicts of memory between the 
supporters of FRELIMO and RENAMO – and not only between these, since memory is 
characterised by many voices also beyond the membership of the two organisations. A 
peasant in rural Manica who suffered from resettlements by FRELIMO in the late 
seventies and therefore found himself compelled to side with RENAMO in an act of 
resistance probably has another view on history than a civil servant in the capital who has 
been looked after by FRELIMO and the governments it formed. Indeed, e.g. Jason Sumich 
(2012: 143) makes clear how differently the past is remembered even in families from the 
urban middle class: While some mentioned the lack of food and a resulting negative 
solidarity among “have-nots” in the late seventies, others praised the presidency of 
Samora Machel as a period in which everything was in order and a societal goal existed, 
with little crime and much solidarity. Just like in other countries, memory is contested in 
Mozambique – yet, there is a lack of public fora and debates – i.e. institutions – that could 
contribute to an acknowledgement of different perceptions of history and potentially to 
an accommodation between these different memories. Such an approach could be the 
basis for attempting a rapprochement in terms of memory culture.  
The outbreak of the conflict in 2012, for which the state and governing party 
FRELIMO and the former rebel organisation RENAMO bear responsibility, makes the 
deep rifts that still characterise Mozambican society most obvious. They conceal funda-
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mentally different experiences within society. There has never been a comprehensive 
reckoning with the civil war from 1977 to 1992, so that until today different versions of 
memory can exist in parallel and thus compete (Igreja 2013: 333). These divisions become 
apparent e.g. based on historical interpretations of a woman from the Mozambican upper 
class whose parents were high-ranking FRELIMO members. The derogatory and arrogant 
manner with which she talks about RENAMO and thus practices a radical othering 
reflects the attitude of many leading FRELIMO and elite members in a striking way:  
“I remember in 1992 when peace was declared and Renamo came out of the bush. They 
were given houses, at least the big guys in the party were. It was one of the conditions of 
peace. When they (Renamo) came here they had no idea how to live in a city. They used to 
wash their clothes and leave them to dry on the front lawn! Can you believe that? These 
people think they could run a country. It’s a joke; they had never been out of the bush 
before.” (cited in Sumich 2012: 145) 
These rifts between memory cultures and differences in perception – in addition to 
political and (rentier) economic factors – contributed to the outbreak of the armed 
conflict. The symbolic level on which antagonistic memory cultures and thus different 
versions of history encounter each other also has to be taken into account concomitantly. 
The national history of Mozambique and the political founding fathers of the country 
continue to be judged in different ways: Especially the constituency and the sympathisers 
of both political camps cherish their own respective objects and narratives of memory, 
which they regard as the only authentic ones. While FRELIMO supporters on the one 
hand honour the socialist-egalitarian ambition for society and their party’s struggle 
against colonialism and apartheid, RENAMO partisans tend to focus on the memory of 
rising up against planned economy, one-party rule and socialism. However, it is unclear 
how the majority of politically unaffiliated Mozambicans position themselves towards 
history, that is to say, which narrative patterns of memory culture are circulating and 
dominant, which memory cultures are considered (in)authentic by which segments of the 
population and how different perceptions are negotiated.  
4.2 Memory Culture in Postcolonial Contexts 
Political founding figures from the early phase of independence who had a lasting impact 
on society, culture and economy are frequently focal points of the memory culture of 
postcolonial states – take for example political protagonists such as Kwame Nkrumah in 
Ghana, Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea, Yomo Kenyatta in Kenia, Léopold Sédar Senghor 
in Senegal, Agostinho Neto in Angola or Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire. This 
is not any different in Mozambique: With Samora Machel (1933–1986) and Eduardo 
Mondlane (1920–1969), Mozambique even has two leaders who have had a lasting impact 
on the nation- and state-building process. However, as leaders of FRELIMO, the Marxist-
Leninist unity party of independent Mozambique from 1975 to 1992, they evoke positive 
memories only in the memory culture of a part of the population. In population groups 
and party members that take a critical to hostile stance towards FRELIMO, they evoke 
negative associations, as is the case not least for RENAMO, but likely also for the MDM. 
In that sense, Mozambique does not differ significantly from other postcolonial states. In 
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countries such as Guinea-Bissau (Kohl 2018), Namibia (du Pisani 2007: 104; Melber 
2017) or Zimbabwe (Barnes et al. 2016: 329), for example, in which former liberation 
movements came to power, the interpretation of history is sometimes strongly polarised 
as the governments formed by the former liberation movements try to subordinate 
memory to their reading and to repress contrary perceptions in society. The current 
conflict can thus also be understood as a result of the repression and negation of 
experiences that do not conform to the official FRELIMO (government) narrative. 
As has become apparent, the two biggest political parties still have geographical 
strongholds, namely RENAMO in the centre of Mozambique, FRELIMO in the rest of the 
country. In the RENAMO strongholds it becomes most visible how controversial the 
postcolonial history and thus memory remains until today. For instance, when the 
RENAMO-led municipal administration named a square after their founder André 
Matsangaissa in 2007, FRELIMO immediately reversed this move after winning the local 
elections shortly afterwards (Igreja 2013). Perhaps Matsangaissa (1950–1979) was an 
affront to FRELIMO also because he had been excluded from FRELIMO several years 
before his rise to RENAMO’s leadership. It is still the FRELIMO founding figures of 
independent Mozambique, Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, after whom many 
streets, squares, schools and educational institutions etc. are named and to whom 
monuments are dedicated in Mozambique. For both Mondlane and Machel have had a 
lasting impact on FRELIMO and independent Mozambique and became tragic heroes 
and victims through their early death. Accordingly, they have enjoyed and continue to 
enjoy great significance in the official government and FRELIMO memory. At the same 
time, however, this officially offered version of memory, produced and promoted by the 
state and governing party, provoked dissent. The counter-hegemonic memory culture 
emphasises the negative aspects of FRELIMO rule and also questions the historical 
achievement of the two founding figures. Names of international freedom fighters, 
statesmen and theorists primarily from the left of the political spectrum (Karl Marx, 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, Julius Nyerere, Amílcar Cabral, Ahmed 
Sékou Touré etc.) used as street names also underline the socialist heritage of FRELIMO 
and “its” state. In addition, the state presidents and the governments, which have always 
been formed by FRELIMO since independence despite multiparty elections, stand as one-
sided versions of history. FRELIMO has a monopoly on steering the memory culture in 
“their” state. Conversely, this means that competing memories are often ignored or 
neglected. The consequence is a split in memory culture. This becomes most obvious 
through the fact that RENAMO leaders, for example, keep a symbolic distance from state 
institutions e.g. by regularly refusing to take part in state festivities such as Independence 
Day on June 25 (Azevedo-Harman 2015: 145). Clear parallels emerge here with another 
former Portuguese colony, Angola, where the former independence movements that 
transformed into political parties and became opponents in the civil war, MPLA 
(Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola), also nourish competing memories. The 
UNITA rejects the Angolan state as not its own, since it was founded by the MPLA and is 
still dominated by it. Therefore, with respect to Mozambique one can ask to what extent 
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opposing memories have a share in the fresh outbreak of violence from the perspective of 
the population and how the experience of new violence changes memories. 
At the same time, there are also discussions within FRELIMO who should be 
remembered and how (Igreja 2013; Sumich 2012). The legitimisation of the claim to 
power – both politically and from a memory culture perspective – is also derived from 
history: Anti-colonial liberation struggle, resistance against apartheid and self-determined 
national development serve as a backdrop on which to project the future. The example 
shows that practices of memory provide “orientation in the present for the purpose of 
acting in the future” [own translation] (Welzer 2010). The academic debate therefore 
coined the term “historical authenticity”. It describes the “authorisation of the past for the 
future” [own translation] (Rehling/Paulmann 2016: 100), and it plays an essential role as a 
bridge from the past via the present towards the future: What matters is which memories 
are perceived as “authentic” by the recipients or are constructed as such by providers of 
memory. Against this background, one can ask how conflicts of interpretation or “wars of 
memory” (Welzer 2007) are waged, to what extent they have a divisive impact on society 
(cf. Assmann 2013) and whether they fuel or even trigger violent conflicts such as the 
current “proto-war”. In the case of Mozambique it has so far remained unclear which 
memories are proclaimed “authentic” or are rejected by which actors or segments of the 
population. There is also little insight so far into the current memory culture of the 
founding figures of postcolonial Mozambique and into how it is challenged; existing 
studies are of a rather cursory nature and focus on elites (Igreja 2013). The conflict 
between FRELIMO and RENAMO makes clear that an investigation is necessary into 
whether and how memory cultures change under the current outbreak of violence and 
how shared memory cultures could perhaps be rendered fruitful for national integration 
e.g. by consciously using ambivalence as a resource in projects or national processes for 
reconciliation (cf. Christophe 2014: 8).  
4.3 Added Value and Necessity of Reckoning with the Past from a Memory 
Culture Perspective 
A series of approaches are conceivable that can make a contribution to reckoning with the 
past from a memory culture perspective. They include (1) research, (2) institution 
building and (3) media work, which will subsequently be discussed in the report. 
(1) Research 
With respect to interpretation patterns of memory culture, two levels are of central 
importance with regard to Mozambique and need to be taken into account. On the one 
hand, “specific narratives” refer to concrete events that occurred in certain places at 
certain times. By contrast, “narrative templates” are of a more fundamental nature, as 
they designate more general, more deep-seated meta-narratives (Wertsch/Karumidze 
2009: 380). Governments, too, partly try to justify such meta-narratives through steered 
politics of memory. Yet, in a country divided along memory cultures such as Mozam-
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bique, current narrative templates and specific narratives are characterised by conside-
rable fractures. An overdue disclosure and analysis of these fractures would help to 
enquire into the conditions for an enhanced national integration of memory cultures, also 
in practical peace and reconciliation work, and to point out paths for peacefully dealing 
with conflict through an accommodation between memory cultures. In general and also 
in Mozambique in particular, it is not possible to write an “objective” history of the 
memory of political founding figures. However, different modalities of remembering the 
founding personalities of independent Mozambique with respect to their impact on 
societal polarisation or unity can be pointed out and approached, that is to say: negotiated 
(Erll 2008: 6–7; cf. also Wertsch 2012). 
A strong memory culture with (largely) shared meta-narratives could represent an 
essential resource for successful nation-building – understood here as the identification of 
the population with the nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1999) across 
ethnic, religious and social boundaries. For such a culture can serve as a common point of 
reference for a strengthened national identity. On the other hand, however, ambivalence, 
i.e. the conscious manoeuvring around a topic without clearly taking up a position, can 
also be a resource for national understanding between memory cultures (Christophe 
2014: 8). While it is frequently the government that – such as in Mozambique – attempts 
“top-down” nation-building, it often faces “bottom-up” processes initiated from the ranks 
of the population and corresponding memories, narratives and traditions that can contri-
bute to nation-building in their own way (Kohl 2012). Not only the official production of 
memory needs to be examined, but especially the reception and the negotiation of such 
offers by the population as well as the construction of counter-hegemonic narratives. For 
the reception of different versions of memory culture on offer is still a frequently 
neglected topic (Christophe 2014: 8–9; cf. also e.g. Arenas 1998; Rodgers 2007). It would 
thus be important to learn more not only on narrative templates (Wertsch/Karumidze 
2009) and specific narratives of the memory culture in Mozambique but also on the 
reception of different versions of memory culture regarding Mozambican political 
founding figures offered by different providers. In this way, “bottom-up” reconciliation 
work could take a practical form, and the conflicts could be transformed and harnessed. 
In particular the Mozambican state and FRELIMO, which controls it, have tried to 
distinguish themselves as the main producers offering interpretations of memory culture 
since independence in 1975. Thanks to its position of state power, FRELIMO can promi-
nently place its heroes, its lieux de mémoire (Pierre Nora), its narratives, be it in the form 
of monuments, street names, squares, bridges, official institutions or historical images 
conveyed through various media. Counter-narratives stem from the ranks of RENAMO, 
among others, and are mainly passed on orally – which is no surprise given a literacy rate 
of just below 60% (UNDP 2016: 233). So far, RENAMO has lacked the power to also 
materially place its versions of memory culture (cf. Igreja 2013: 335). All in all, however, it 
is unknown how Mozambicans position themselves towards institutionalised objects of 
memory culture, whether, for instance, they share this offer, reject it or adopt it in a 
modified form. 
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(2) Institution Building 
It is a promising approach to render ambivalent memory fruitful for peacefully dealing 
with the conflict and thus for national integration through the creation of institutions. 
Lewis A. Coser (1956) already pointed out that social conflicts drive institution building 
forward. Conversely, institutions are important for creating moderated forms of memory 
culture reconciliation work so that conflicts, once addressed, can be moderated, accompa-
nied and structured. 
Transferred to the present context, this means that social conflicts can contribute to 
the consolidation and convergence of Mozambican society or to the further integration of 
the Mozambican nation, provided that they are negotiated. Moreover, in this context, the 
argument by Marita Sturken (1997) is relevant that conflicts lead to ambivalent forms of 
remembering that are open to interpretation. Sturken generally considers them as 
indicators for the emergence of a democratic and plural (i.e. the equal coexistence of 
different objects of) memory.  
So-called truth and reconciliation commissions at different levels (national, regional, 
local etc.) can help contribute to a sustainable reckoning with the past. Realistically, it also 
must be said that the political constellations have so far been unfavourable to such an 
endeavour. An open and inclusive reckoning with the past would, however, still make sense.  
In fact, empirical studies on Sierra Leone and South Africa (z.B. Sesay 2007; Clark 
2012), among others, suggest that truth commissions and the articulation of transverse 
narrations taking place there can be valuable for national reconciliation under certain 
conditions. With respect to the South African truth and reconciliation commission, for 
example, Janine Natalya reaches the conclusion that:  
“while TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] truths may be healing for some 
victims, the supposedly cathartic effects of truth-telling should not be overemphasized. It is 
the overall process and the extent to which victims’ needs are given priority that are critical 
to the question of whether truth is healing.” (Clark 2012: 202)  
Moreover, she emphasises the necessity of embedding such commissions in society. For:  
“TRCs are temporary bodies with limited resources and the pressures they face are 
immense. Yet, if they are disconnected from victims and local communities, and if the 
truths that they establish have little resonance at the grassroots level, an important 
dimension of the possible relationship between truth and reconciliation will remain 
underexplored.” (Clark 2012: 202)  
She considers it very significant that willingness, openness and spaces must be present, 
not only in the political sphere, in order to implement recommendations issued by truth 
and reconciliation commissions:  
“[W]hile it is ultimately the government of the day that decides whether or not to 
implement a TRC’s recommendations, the responsibility of dealing with the truth 
established lies not just with those who are in power but more broadly with society as a 
whole.” (Clark 2012: 203) 
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Other studies, too, point to the necessity of a fundamental willingness in society to deal 
with the past conflict. For instance, Amadu Sesay sums up the insights from the activity of 
the truth and reconciliation commission in Sierra Leone as follows:  
“[…] the success of a TRC will depend to a large extent on whether it is able to address the 
background conditions that led to the hostilities on the one hand, and on the other, its 
ability to put in place mechanisms that will effect qualitative changes to the post conflict 
political and social conditions of the population in particular and the country in general.” 
(Sesay 2007: 46)  
Moreover, he draws attention to compensation for suffered injustices and the capacity of 
the political decision makers to deliver them, without which, according to him, a lasting 
reconciliation can hardly be achieved:  
“[…] truth-telling as a means of healing the wounds of the past and coping with the future, 
without socio-economic empowerment is ephemeral; a mere short-term palliative that does 
not address substantive and long-term needs in the post conflict dispensation.” (Sesay 2007: 
46) 
The establishment of courts as an expression of a transitional justice system, as occurred 
in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and South Africa, among others, has also turned out to be an 
albeit limited means for reckoning with past violent conflicts. Fidelma Donlon quotes a 
quantitative study according to which the large majority of the inhabitants of Sierra Leone 
and Liberia were satisfied with the work of the Sierra Leonean transitional justice system 
and regarded criminal prosecution and the rule of law as guaranteed (Donlon 2013: 873–
74). It is of paramount importance to guarantee a solid and permanent financing of the 
transitional justice system, for which not only the national government but also the UN 
and bilateral donor countries have to be responsible (Donlon 2013: 872–873). This must 
be accompanied by guaranteed sufficient staffing in order to ensure the court’s ability to 
work (Barria/Roper 2005: 364). However, especially the example of Rwanda makes the 
limits of transitional justice clear, as the court did not manage to charge the sitting 
president, who is accused of being implicated in the atrocities (Morrill 2012).  
“Bottom-up” institutions administering justice at the local level can also contribute to 
restoring reconciliation and justice. The Rwandan Gacaca are a well-known example of 
this. They are a system of community-based jurisdiction that is to be partly based on local 
traditions. The government introduced the Gacaca after the genocide. The result of these 
institutions was not:  
“‘a collective remembering’ or ‘truth’ in the face of the restrictive dominant [governmental] 
narrative of history in Rwanda, but rather, […] a fight against forgetting and a reminder of 
constant contestation.” (Doughty 2011: 243)  
The mode of operation of these institutions is assessed as rather ambivalent by Kristin C. 
Doughty:  
“Overall, gacaca sessions did not simply create restorative harmony, nor did they simply 
deepen a single division between Hutu and Tutsi. The depth of fractures revealed the 
ongoing anger, pain, and frustration on all sides that the mediation discourse struggled to 
accommodate and overcome.” (Doughty 2011: 243)  
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Despite all merits of the Gacaca that are reflected in the positive public opinion of 
Rwanda, they have also been criticised in various ways. These points of criticism have to 
be taken into consideration when implementing local jurisdiction in future. Frequently 
stated problems were the traumatic burden for witnesses, the retroactive application of 
laws, the lack of rights for the accused, the insufficient participation of local communities 
in the creation of Gacaca, the lack of tribunals against political leaders, the fact that even 
Gacaca judges were sometimes implicated in the genocide, corruption and favouritism in 
the courts as well as a lack of victim and witness protection (Brehm et al. 2014: 338). 
The conflict between the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO shows that a 
reckoning with the past is an urgent necessity. The most recent outbreaks of violence in 
October 2017 in the north of Mozambique (Morier-Genoud 2017b; Vines 2017) not only 
point to the latent potential for violence in the country. Violence is still perceived as a 
legitimate means of asserting interests – also because a democratic culture exists only on 
the surface, existing institutions are sometimes met with little trust or institutions that 
might be able to mediate in conflicts are lacking. The attack by suspected Islamists also 
has to be viewed against this background. It is true that only a small group launched the 
attack. However, the policies of the FRELIMO central government in the capital, which 
has a strong Christian character and is located in the far south, towards the Muslims in 
the north have never been part of a public discussion. Since FRELIMO took power in 
1975, Islam was initially suppressed, just like other religions (including Christianity). That 
Samora Machel entered a mosque with his shoes on or that the government insisted, in 
the name of their paradigm of progress, on building pigsties also in predominantly 
Muslim regions has become deeply engraved in many Muslims’ minds (Morier-Genoud 
2017b). It would thus make all the more sense to initiate an institutionalised “bottom-up” 
way of reckoning with the past, in order to bring those Mozambicans on board who feel 
marginalised, socially and in terms of their memory culture, and in order to thus 
permanently strengthen cohesion at the state and national level.  
(3) Media 
In countries of the postcolonial Global South, such as Mozambique, memory is often 
much more strongly oriented towards the oral, especially outside the urban centres and 
beyond the upper and middle classes. The print media sector is relatively weak, and many 
Mozambicans only have limited access to print publications. To a certain extent, schools 
and school books represent an exception as regards access to print media, provided that 
there are sufficient financial resources for teaching materials available in the families. As 
Elisabete Azevedo-Harman (2015: 148) remarks, the internet, and with it social networks, 
have provided the country with a new, also critical medium.  
There are hardly any studies for Mozambique on the importance of oral memory that 
specifically inquire, beyond colonial memories or memories of the war of independence, 
about current memory cultures, for example revolving around the political founding figures 
and their relevance for the future development of the country (see e.g. Igreja 2008).  
 
Armed Conflict and Contested Memory  21 
 
Concretely, different media formats (such as educational media or school lessons, for 
example) could broach the issue of diverging memories – going beyond the already 
discussed academic investigation of the diverse memory cultures – and thus initiate a 
discussion. This should by no means only deal with the main protagonists of the struggle 
for independence. Rather, histories of suffering and victimhood by people affected in 
different segments of the population should be given centre stage in reckoning with the 
violent conflicts. Here it can be discussed how immediate memories of events and actors 
relate to meta-narratives, whether and to what extent authenticity is attributed to them or 
denied, what has so far been passed on in oral and written form (or not – and why) and 
which visions for the future are derived from the memories. Quite practically, it could 
also be negotiated, among other things, how memories can enter into largely accepted 
toponymic references. What is important in such a media-related (and other) form of 
reckoning with the past, is (1) not to contrapose “good” and “bad”, (2) to give the floor to 
different groups of actors, (3) to provide much space for emotions and empathy and (4) 
to make historical and socio-political contextualisations possible (Bull/Hansen 2016: 399). 
Furthermore, employing mixed school book commissions could be envisioned in 
order to develop new teaching materials that provide space for the heterogeneous inter-
pretations of history in Mozambique and that could draw on related experiences at the 
international level (see for example Strobel 2014). The educational researcher Falk Pingel 
offers the positive example of the development of an Israeli-Palestinian school book that 
tries to juxtapose Israeli and Palestinian narratives of memory and history instead of 
harmonising them in order to prompt discussions with the goal of reconciliation:  
“On one hand, the group of teachers and university historians working in the project 
recognizes that each side has its own narrative that is firmly anchored in a long history and 
strongly linked to a set of national feelings, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions that cannot 
be neglected. On the other hand, each side tries to understand the other’s narrative, to discuss 
both narratives, and to subject both versions to scientific scrutiny. Critical questioning of the 
other’s interpretation involves being critical of oneself. Truth turns out to be a 
communication process. Thus, the material consists of two “national” narratives presented on 
the left and right side of a double page, leaving blank space in between where teachers and 
students can write down their own interpretation and comments.” (Pingel 2008: 189) 
According to Pingel, the underlying assumption is “on one hand, the duality of the 
narrative as the point of departure, but, on the other hand, of encouraging recognition 
between each group as a legitimate bearer of opposed narratives.” (Pingel 2008: 189). 
Another example is afforded by the German-Polish school book commission set up in 
1970 – which at the same time illustrates that developing school books is very time-
consuming and can take up several years to decades (Pingel 2008: 190; Strobel 2014). 
Especially in countries such as Rwanda or Bosnia and Herzegovina in which history and 
memory are strongly contested and politicised, the development of new educational 
media is frequently characterised by blockades and requires a sustained, sensitive 
approach (Pingel 2008: 185, 187–188, 192–193). 
The umbrella organisation “European Association of History Educators” (EUROCLIO), 
which was founded at the request of the Council of Europe in 1993 and which, by its own 
account, brings together more than seventy not only European pedagogical organisations 
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from the areas of history, cultural heritage and political education, can also serve as a role 
model. EUROCLIO, which works together with the German Körber Foundation and the 
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Brunswick,  
“supports the development of responsible and innovative history, citizenship and heritage 
education by promoting critical thinking, multi-perspectivity, mutual respect, and the 
inclusion of controversial issues. The Association advocates a sound use of history and 
heritage education towards the building and deepening of democratic societies, connecting 
professionals across boundaries of communities, countries, ethnicities and religions.”3 
UNESCO has also been dedicating itself to the revision of educational media for a long 
time and has summed up its expertise on this field in a guidebook (Pingel 2010). 
UNESCO emphasises that school books (and other educational media) can play a very 
central role for peace and reconciliation:  
“Faced with formerly unknown violence and challenged by the emergence of pluralistic 
political structures, international intervention, elements of civil society grassroots work and 
domestic reconstruction policy often lead to a mixture of tools for pacification and 
reconciliation in which textbook revision is only one, but still an important, aspect.” (Pingel 
2010: 25)  
For, as the guidebook emphasises:  
“The role of textbook revision has to be placed into the wider framework of transitional 
justice and reconciliation measures such as trials, truth commissions, and remembrance 
ceremonies.” (Pingel 2010: 5). 
In summary, we can conclude: Different, discrepant memories coexist in Mozambique. 
Processing and negotiating these different strands of memory and historical narratives 
can support an overall pacification of society in Mozambique and pave the way for a 
lasting reconciliation. For only if the heterogeneous views and perspectives of memory, 
and likewise the needs and demands of large segments of the Mozambican population, are 
included in the projection of the nation and its joint future can a peaceful society be 
realised that is more inclusive with respect to memory culture. Processing memory is to 
the benefit of developing perspectives for the future: Visions of the future (Welzer 2010) 
form a promising teleological dimension of national integration with respect to memory 
culture in Mozambique. An effective reckoning with the past in Mozambique should 
therefore link memory cultures and memories of the future to matters of societal 
integration and the role of political founding figures in postcolonial Mozambique. 
Memory thus structures and predisposes future developments to a certain extent.  
  
3  https://euroclio.eu/who-we-are; 18.12.2017. 
 
 
 
Armed Conflict and Contested Memory  23 
 
5. Conclusion: How It Could Be Done Better 
As the previous deliberations make clear, a strategy of avoiding an open and constructive 
way of dealing with the civil war between the government formed by FRELIMO and the 
insurgent RENAMO contributed to a medium-term pacification of Mozambique, but in 
the long term it presumably led to the fresh outbreak of the violent conflict in 2012. While 
it is a valid observation that political and economic imbalances are essential root causes 
for the conflict, they are accompanied by fundamental rifts in memory culture that divide 
not only the supporters of FRELIMO and RENAMO but the entire society and nation. 
Due to short-sighted pragmatic considerations in the mid-nineties, a national reconci-
liation process involving not only the elites and/or a transitional justice system (as e.g. in 
neighbouring South Africa, Clark 2012) was not established. The consequences were 
widespread distrust and the mutual negation of historical narratives and memory 
cultures. Especially the representatives of the two big parties stubbornly stick to their 
perceptions of history and memory and to their images of the political opponent as an 
enemy and have so far not or hardly been ready for a mutual rapprochement. Pro forma, 
FRELIMO still feels committed to the idea of modernisation and to national unity, and it 
sees itself in a strengthened position – through partly manipulated election results. It 
wants to defend its power, views itself as “state party” and understands the Mozambican 
state as its oeuvre, its property. Due to the brutal prosecution of the civil war by the insur-
gents, and due to the fact that their leadership does not hail from the environs of the 
capital region, RENAMO is treated condescendingly by FRELIMO. By contrast, 
RENAMO under its long-term leader, who is also not very democratically-minded and 
also oriented towards power strategies and the (rentier) economy, casts itself as a 
champion of democracy and anti-Marxism that wants to curb the authoritarian, selfish 
behaviour of the former unity party FRELIMO. The relationship between the two parties 
is characterised by a deep mistrust. The antagonistic images of the self and the enemy 
shape the contrasting memories.  
Especially now that Mozambique finds itself in a profound economic and fiscal crisis 
and the country is looking for funds to fill the financial gaps after the withdrawal of most 
of the international donor countries and institutions (with the exception of China) in 
order to keep civil servants happy and central services such as water and power supply 
running, the fourteen donors of direct budgetary aid for Mozambique as well as central 
bilateral donor countries such as Germany as the most important donor in the area of 
basic and vocational education (Deutsche Botschaft Maputo 2017) would have some 
leverage to lobby both conflict parties over a profound reconciliation – especially beyond 
the political elite. They could demand concrete peacebuilding measures, such as 
establishing a truth and reconciliation commission or joint commissions for revising and 
developing new educational media or carrying out studies and media-pedagogical 
projects and support their implementation. Especially German development cooperation 
– and here in particular the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ, German Corporation for International Cooperation) with its expertise in the area of 
education and conflict management and the Federal Foreign Office as a sponsor of 
projects in the area of culture, but also German non-governmental organisations such as 
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the World Peace Service or the Forum Civil Peace Service – could get involved in the 
framework outlined, or could enhance existing engagements with new projects in order to 
make an important contribution to a reckoning with the past from a memory culture 
perspective. In addition, alliances such as EUROCLIO, whose members include the Georg 
Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and the Körber Foundation, as well 
as supranational institutions such as UNESCO have expertise in the area of systematically 
revising educational media in order to contribute to a reckoning with the past from a 
memory culture perspective. 
Perhaps only a change in the RENAMO leadership and a generational change within 
FRELIMO will lead not only to a lasting resolution of the current conflict, but also to a 
reckoning with the past and a reconciliation of memory cultures. This would have to 
include large parts of the population and the media. In order to be able to resolve the 
conflict sustainably, in the sense of inclusive nation-building that fosters trust working 
with memory cultures, it is foremost necessary for research and also the media to pay 
attention to which different narratives of memory culture circulate within the population, 
how they can constructively be negotiated in public – of course, without overlooking and 
ignoring demands for judicial justice and for reckoning with the atrocities committed in 
the civil war. 
In view of the refusal up to now of the leaderships of both political organisations to 
(also) approach each other at this level, it would be necessary for the fourteen donors of 
direct budgetary aid and central bilateral donor countries such as Germany, but also local 
civil society, to work towards convincing the Mozambican government of the necessity 
not only of a political opening but also of a lasting reconciliation, reaching beyond 
intellectual and political elites. A central condition for this is that such debates also take 
place in the media that are accessible to the bulk of the Mozambicans, also and especially 
in the rural areas outside the few big cities; also via radio, TV, but also in social networks 
– less in print publications that experience has shown to be geographically and socially 
limited in their reach. All this is a long process that will not deliver the short-term and 
quickly measurable results that are often envisioned by donors. By contrast, “bottom-up” 
oriented projects of peace and reconciliation work can deliver important impetus and 
insight in order to abet a permanent inclusion in terms of memory culture and thus peace 
and reconciliation.  
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